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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs brought this action seeking a declara-
tory JUdgment action to determine the validity of a written 
Compensation Agreement that provided for the payment to defendants 
ot $250,000.00 and fifteen percent (15%) of the stock in a 
corporation to be formed for the marketing of a principal adjusted 
mortgage. Plaintiffs also sought damages based on alleged 
fraudulent representations of the defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Law and Motion 
Division of tne Tnird Judicial District Court denied defendants' 
Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to 
Join Additional Parties. Subsequently plaintiffs and defendants 
stipulated to the entry of Judgment on one of the claims of the 
plaintiffs and the dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims. The 
defendants have appealed from the denial of their Motion for Leave 
to File an Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional 
Parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of the District Court's Order 
denying their Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim and to Join Additional Parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the fall of 1981 plaintiffs incorporated The McNeil/ 
Mehew Group ("McNeil/Mehew") and sought investors to capitalize 
McNeil/Mehew in order to market a principal adjusted mortgage to 
financial institutions throughout the United States. 
At plaintiffs' request, Cowan and Benz interested two 
investor groups. On December 3, 1981, proposals for investment in 
McNeil/Mehew were made to these two investor groups -- a "Neppel" 
group and a "Remlinger" or "Buttonwood Management Associates" 
group. 
Plaintiffs signed a written Compensation Agreement which 
provided that if the Remlinger Group agreed to capitalize 
McNeil/Mehew, that Cowan and Benz would be entitled to $250,000 
and 15% of the stock. (Tr. at 11-12, 557-58). 
The plaintiffs thereafter made an agreement with the 
Remlinger Group wherein Buttonwood invested $350,000 in 
McNeil/Mehew in exchange for 49% of the corporate stock. Neither 
payment of any compensation nor issuance of stock was made to 
Cowan and Benz. Rerulinger and Buttonwood had been advised of the 
written Compensation Agreement, but ignored it. 
On January 28, 1982, plaintiffs filed a declaratory 
judgment action against Cowan and Benz seeking a judgment that the 
written Compensation Agreement was void and unenforceable. 
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Defendant Benz, a resident of New Jersey, filed a Motion 
lo Quash Service or, in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss for 
Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. This Motion was denied, and a 
Petition for Intermediate Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was 
also denied. 
On May 3, 1982, Defendant Benz filed an Answer generally 
denying the allegations of plaintiffs' Complaint. Defendant Benz 
asserted no counterclaims against Plaintiffs McGregor and 
Richardson at that time in order to preserve his objection to the 
court's in personam jurisdiction. 
On May 3, 1982, Defendants Benz and Cowan filed a 
Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey against Richardson; 
McGregor; Donald Remlinger; McNeil/Mehew Group, Inc., a Utah 
corporation; and B.M.C. Acquisition Corporation, a New York 
corporation, d/b/a Buttonwood Management Company, defendants. 
This action alleged breach of the written Compensation Agreement 
and claimed damages of $250,000 and 15% of the stock of McNeil/ 
Mehew. Claims of tortious interference with prospective economic 
relations, tortious interference with business relations, and 
inducement to breach a contract were also alleged. 
224-30, 548-54). 
(Tr. at 
On June 21, 1982, plaintiffs in the Utah action filed a 
Motion for an Expedited Trial Setting. This Motion was denied, 
but the court did set a trial date of April 11, 1983. 
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In the New Jersey action, McGregor, Richardson, Remlinger 
and the other defendants moved to dismiss or stay the New Jersey 
action because of the pending action in Utah. On November 4, 1982 
the New Jersey action was stayed on certain conditions, one of 
which was that Remlinger submit to the jurisdiction of the Utah 
Court. (Tr. at 235-37, 559-61). 
On January 12, 1983, defendants filed their Motion for 
Leave to File an Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to Join 
Additional Parties. The proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim 
was essentially identical to the action filed in the New Jersey 
Court. (Tr. at 206-19, 258-72). 
On March 7, 1983, the District Court denied the 
Defendants' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim and to Join Additional Parties. The court also 
entered a certain Memorandum Decision. (Tr. at 365-67). 
On or about March 16, 1983, Defendants Benz and Cowan 
filed a Motion to Reconsider, or in the Alternative, to Amend 
Order of the Court. That Motion was denied. 
On March 31, 1983, Defendants Benz and Cowan filed with 
this Court a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ in the Nature of 
Mandamus. Oral argument was heard on April 4, 1983. The Motion 
was denied without an explanation as to the basis for the denial. 
-4-
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING THE 
DEFENDANTS TO FILE COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS AND TO JOIN 
ADDITIONAL PARTIES. 
A. Defendants' Counterclaims are Compulsory in Nature. 
Defendants' Counterclaims for breach of the written 
Compensation Agreement and for damages as a result of plaintiffs' 
tortious conduct are compulsory counterclaims. The refusal of the 
trial court to allow the defendants to litigate their counterclaims 
in this action, unless reversed, will result in the claims forever 
being barred. 
in part: 
Rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states 
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim 
any claim which at the time of serving the 
pleading the pleader has against any opposing 
party, if it arises out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
opposing party's claim and does not reguire 
for its adjudication the presence of third 
parties of whom the court cannot acquire 
jurisdiction. 
(Emphasis added). 
Defendants' counterclaims arise out of the same trans-
action or occurrence that formed the basis for plaintiffs' action; 
plaintiffs do not and cannot contest this fact. Plaintiffs' 
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Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the Compensation 
Agreement between the plaintiffs and defendants is void and 
unenforceable as well as damages for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions. The defendants' Counterclaim seeks an award of the $250,0Gl 
and 15% of the stock of McNeil/Mehew as set forth in the 
Compensation Agreement. Defendants' counterclaims of tortious 
interference with prospective economic relations, tortious 
interference with business relations, and inducement to breach a 
contract all arise out of the same transaction. 
B. The Compulsory Counterclaims of the Defendants 
Will Be Barred if not Allowed to be Litigated 
in this Action. 
Rule 13(a) precludes assertion of a counterclaim which 
should have been asserted in a prior action. See generally, 22 
A.L.R.2d 621 (and subsequent supplements). The Utah Supreme Court 
in Todaro v. Gardner, 285 P. 2d 839, 842 (Utah 1955), stated that "a 
counterclaim not presented to the court on a matter involving the 
same transaction is forever barred." See Slim Olson, Inc. v. 
Winegar, 246 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1952); 6 Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 1417. 
In Cyclops Corporation v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 71 
F.R.D. 616 (W.D. Pa. 1976), the court stated: 
The failure to assert a compulsory counter-
claim precludes its later assertion in another, 
subsequent lawsuit. In so holding, the federal 
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courts have reasoned that (1) the sheer force of 
Rule 13(a) prevents later suits, or (2) that the 
principle of res judicata, apart from the policy 
of Rule 13(a), precludes the litigation of claims 
that either were actually litigated or could have 
been litigated between the same parties in a 
prior lawsuit. 
Id. at 620. 
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision expressed 
concern about potential prejudice to plaintiffs because granting 
defenaants' Motion would postpone the trial date. Some inconven-
ience may have been imposed upon plaintiffs if the time for 
adJudicating their claims had been delayed. Plaintiffs' 
inconvenience, however, is minimal compared to the permanent 
pre)ud1ce sustained by the defendants if their compulsory 
counterclaims are not allowed to be tried in this action. If 
defenaants' compulsory counterclaims are not allowed to be tried 
in this action, they will never be adjudicated. Justice requires 
that the plaintiffs' day in court be postponed rather than the 
defendants' day in court be forever foreclosed. 
C. The Stay of the New Jersey Action was Based on Plaintiffs' 
Representation that Defendants' Claims Could be Litigated 
in the Utah Action. 
The Complaint filed by Cowan and Benz in New Jersey 
sought damages for breach of the written Compensation Agreement, 
unJust enrichment, inducement to breach a contract and tortious 
-7-
interference with a prospective economic advantage. (Tr. at 
224-30, 548-54). These same causes of action were alleged in 
Cowan's and Benz's Counterclaim. 
Richardson, McGregor, Remlinger and McNeil/Mehew filed a 
Joint Memorandum in support of their Motion to Dismiss or Stay the 
New Jersey action. (Tr. at 562-70A). This Memorandum stated: 
Defendants Eldon L. Richardson, II 
("Richardson"), D. Scott McGregor ("McGregor"), 
Donald Remlinger ("Remlinger") and McNeil/Mehew 
Group, Inc. ("McNeil/Mehew"), submit this 
Memorandum in support of their motion to stay 
this proceeding pending resolution of a prior 
pending action in the State of Utah implicating 
precisely the same issues. The Utah action will 
effectively dispose of this controversy. As 
shall be demonstrated, the single appropriate 
course is for this Court to stay the New Jersey 
action pending resolution of the controversy in 
Utah. The entire relief sought in this action 
can undoubtedly be obtained in the previously 
commenced Utah action; the issues and the parties 
in the two suits are substantially the same; and 
there are surely no special equities which would 
compel this Court to allow this action to go 
forward. 
(Tr. at 563). 
* * * 
This action is therefore the mirror image of 
the Utah action. No discovery has been taken by 
either party in the New Jersey action. Nor are 
there any motions or other proceedings currently 
pending in the New Jersey action; by contrast, 
the Utah action is actively being litigated. 
Consequently, defendants in this action move this 
Court to stay the New Jersey proceeding pending 
the outcome of the prior pending action in the 
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Third Judicial District Court of Utah, which w'll 
effectively dispose of all of the issues in this 
Action. 
(Tr. at 564-65). 
* * * 
The Utah action will certainly afford 
"adequate relief" and "do complete justice" 
between these parties. No "special equity" 
militates to deny these defendants the relief 
they seek. 
The issue presented by this action --- the 
validity and possible enforcement of the 
Compensation Agreement --- is identical to that 
presented in the Utah action, where all of the 
matters in controversy between the parties can be 
resolved. In the interest of conservation of 
judicial resources, avoidance of duplication of 
litigation and the convenience of the parties, 
this Court should stay the within proceedings 
pending the completion of the Utah action. 
(Tr. at 567). 
* * * 
In view of all the circumstances before this 
Court, and in light of the foregoing principles 
of law, it is needless and undesirable to proceed 
here and in Utah simultaneously. Indeed, to 
allow this action to go forward at this time 
would cause unnecessary duplication of discovery, 
litigation and annoyance and harassment of the 
defendants in this action. Consequently, this 
action should be stayed pending conclusion of the 
Utan action. 
(Tr. at 570). 
The New Jersey Court entered a stay order: 
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ORDERED that this action be and the same 
hereby is stayed as to all proceedings pending 
the disposition of an action in the courts of the 
State of Utah entitled D. Scott McGregor and 
Eldon L. Richardson, II v. Peter A. Benz and 
David Cowan, Civil No. C-82-727, on condition 
that Donald Remlinger not contest the exercise of 
jurisdiction over him by the courts of Utah in 
any claim asserted by the defendants here and 
arising out of the same transactions and 
occurrences in issue in this or that action; and 
* * * 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event the 
defendants in the Utah action assert a claim 
naming as a defendant there any of the defendants 
named here over whom the Utah court determines it 
has no jurisdiction, leave is given to any party 
on notice in accordance with the Rules Governing 
the Courts of the State of New Jersey to move to 
dissolve the stay granted herein for good cause 
shown, provided, however, that nothing in this 
Order shall be deemed to permit any party 
automatically to dissolve this stay. 
(Tr. at 236-37, 560-61). 
Richardson and McGregor represented to the New Jersey 
Court that it should stay the New Jersey action because all issues 
between the parties could be litigated in the Utah action. They 
then vigorously argued that the Utah trial court should not allow 
the defendants to assert its counterclaims. It would be a gross 
injustice for defendants Benz and Cowan to be denied the right to 
litigate their claims in this action; plaintiffs should be estoppea 
to argue that such denial is just and proper. 
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D. Based Upon Review Standards Applied at Both the Federal 
and State Levels, the Trial Court Abused its Discretion 
in Refusing to Allow Defendants to File Their Compulsory 
Counterclaims. 
Defendants have found no Utah case law setting forth the 
specific criteria to determine whether a trial court has committed 
an abuse of discretion in refusing to allow a party to amend its 
pleadings to assert compulsory counterclaims. However, under the 
clearly articulated standards of the federal courts and other 
Jurisdictions, the trial court committed error in this case. 
1. Federal Case Law. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear 
tnat courts must heed the mandate of Rule 15(a) 1 that leave to 
amend "shall be freely given when Justice so requires." Foman v. 
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 9 L.Ed.2d 222, 226 (1962). Polin v. Dun 
& Bradstreet, Inc., 511 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1975); Food Basket, 
Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1967); Travelers 
Indemnity Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1967); 
Ziegler v. Akin, :l61 F.2d 88 (10th Cir. 1958). 
In the absence of any apparent or declared 
reason -- such as undue delay, bad faith or 
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 
lRule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is 
iaentical to the Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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amenaments previously allowed, undue prejudice to 
the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 
amendment, futility of amendment, etc. -- the 
leave sought should, as the rules require, be 
'freely given'. 
Foman, supra at 226. 
The rationale of this liberal amendment policy is to 
insure that litigants have an opportunity to test on the merits 
the validity of their claims. 
In Refrigeradora Del Noroeste S.A. v. Appelbaum, 248 
F.2d, 858 (7th Cir. 1957), the Seventh Circuit referred to the 
manaate of Rule 15(a). The court held that it was error to deny 
the motion for leave to file an answer and counterclaim because 
the plaintiff corporation was not available for service of process 
anywhere within the United States. The court of appeals concluded 
that the trial court, by refusing to permit the amendment to be 
filed, had, in fact, denied the defendant his day in court. Id. 
at 862. 
2. Case Law From Other States. 
A carefully considered line of authority on the question 
of leave to amend or add a compulsory counterclaim comes from the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. In Randolph v. Franklin 
Investment Co., 398 A.2d 340 (D.C. App. 1979) (argued en bane 
1978), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated: 
In the present record we find none of the 
reasons which the courts have used to justify 
denial of leave· to file a counterclaim. This was 
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tne Randolphs' first such request. The case had 
been pending little more than ten months. No 
party previously nad requested a continuance. 
There was no indication of bad faith or dilatory 
motive on the Randolphs' part. The counterclaim 
was not obviously without merit. Finally, we do 
not perceive preJudice. 
Id. at 351 (footnotes omitted). The court reversed and ordered 
the trial court to allow the plaintiffs to file their counterclaim. 
In Bronson v. Borst, 404 A.2d 960 (D.C. App. 1979), the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals again stated the criteria 
for determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in 
denying a motion for leave to amend the answer to include a 
compulsory counterclaim: 
Tnose criteria include: the number of such 
requests, the length of the pendency of the 
trial, the number of previous continuances, the 
existence of bad faith or dilatory motive, the 
merit of the counterclaim, and the existence of 
preJudice to the other party. 
.!!:!_. at 96:S. In Bronson the court concluded that the trial court 
erred in its decision to deny the request to file a compulsory 
counterclaim. Those same criteria have been applied in that 
Jurisdiction in subsequent cases. See Bennett v. Fun & Fitness 
ot Silver Hill, Inc., 434 A.2d 476 (D.C. App. 1981); Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity Company v. District of Columbia, 441 A.2d 
969 (D.C. App. 1982). 
In Romish v. Albo, 291 So.2d 24 (Fla. App. 1974), the 
court ruled that the trial court's failure to grant leave to amend 
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in that case was an abuse of discretion where counsel for one ot 
the parties had discovered information creating a valid compulsory 
counterclaim six months after filing the answer. Id. at 25. 
Defendants' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim was the first and only such request for leave to 
amend pleadings. No continuances of any trial date had been 
sought in this case. There is no basis for asserting that 
defendants' Motion was submitted either in baa faith or because 
of dilatory motive. The merit of defendants' counterclaims is 
readily apparent. 
The only pre]udice that was asserted by plaintiffs was 
that the trial date would be postponed. An impartial weighing of 
the interests of Justice requires that plaintiffs' day in court be 
delayed in order that defendants may have their day in court. The 
trial court abused its discretion in not granting leave to the 
defendants to file their compulsory counterclaims. 
II. THE JOINDER OF ADDITIONAL PARTIES IS NECESSARY FOR A 
COMPLETE ADJUDICATION OF THE MATTERS IN CONTROVERSY. 
A. Leave to Amend Should be Freely Granted to Allow 
Complete AdJudication of Matters in Controversy. 
Rule 15(a), U.R.C.P., provides that leave to amend 
pleadings should be freely granted. The Utah Supreme Court has 
indicated that this rule should be liberally construed so that all 
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elements of a controversy may be decided and determined in one 
action. In Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 57 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1936), the 
court stated: 
The amended complaint was filed before trial and 
oefendants' answer thereto was filed before trial 
of the cause .••• A more liberal rule will be 
applied in cases where amendments are offered 
unoer such circumstances than when offered during 
or after trial, where the parties may be taken by 
surprise or handicapped in the meeting of new 
allegations. The rule, however, is toward 
liberality in allowance of amendments to plead-
ings for the purpose of permitting a complete 
ad]udication of the matters in controversy and in 
the furtherance of justice. 
Id. at 1136. 
In Thomas J. PecK & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, 
Inc., 515 P.2d 446 (Utah 1973), the court stated: 
Some tempest has been raised about the court 
allowing the plaintiff to make tardy amendments 
to the pleadings. In doing so he wisely and 
properly stated: 
The pleadings are never more important 
than the cause that is before the court 
. • • • There can be no prejudice in this 
case because we'll give ample time for any 
answer • • • • 
Tnis is in harmony with what we regard as the 
correct policy: of recognizing the desirability 
of the pleadings setting forth definitely framed 
issues, but also of permitting amendment where 
the interest of Justice so requires, and the 
adverse party is given fair opportunity to meet 
it. 
Id. at 449-50. 
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B. Defei::!.dants' Meritor iou~-~~unt~~~~ms Incluc!_~_f!.~~~ 
~ainst Nonr~~idents. 
Defendants have alleged breach of the written 
Compensation Agreement and claims in tort against the additional 
parties Remlinger, McNeil/Mehew, Buttonwood, and the individual 
partners of Buttonwood. These tort claims are (1) tortious 
interference with prospective economic relations, (2) tortious 
interference with business relations, and (3) inducement to breach 
a contract. 
Each of these torts is recognized by Utah law. The Utah 
Supreme Court in ~~h Furniture and_~arpe~<;:_~:__~~ Isom, No. 17264 
(Utah 1982), recently recognized for the first time the tort of 
tortious interference with prospective economic relations. 
Tortious interference with business relations is also recognized 
in Utah, see, ~· '!:_urtle Mana~~~t:..L._!i::!.~':!~9..is Management, 
Inc., 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982): Glob~~~~~~i::!.9.._~~~~~nk of 
Sa~t Lake, 586 P.2d 420 (Utah 1978). The tort of inducement to 
breach a contract was recognized in Moun~aii::!._§.tate~_Sports~_Inc. 
v. Sharman, 353 F. Supp. 613 (D. Utah 1972), rev'<!_~n other 
grounds, EckleLv· Sharman, 548 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1977). 
c. All of the Additional Parties are Subject to the 
Jurisdiction Q~he Uta~~~urts. 
The McNeil/Mehew Group, Inc. is a Utah corporation and 
transacts business in Utah. The stay of the New Jersey state 
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court action was expressly conditioned on Remlinger's submission to 
the Jurisdiction of the courts of Utah. (Tr. at 235-37, 559-61). 
The Buttonwood partnership and the individual partners are 
subJect to the personal jurisdiction of this Court under the Utah 
long-arm statute.
2 
See Mallory Engineering, Inc. v. Ted R. Brown 
& Assoc., Inc., 618 P.2d 1004, 1005-07 (Utah 1980). 
1. The Nonresidents Sought to be Joined as Parties Have 
Caused Tortious Injury Within This State. 
The actions of the nonresident counterclaim 
defendants, through their agent(s), have deprived a Utah citizen 
(Cowan) of his compensation under the written Compensation 
Agreement and deprived defendants Cowan and Benz of the economic 
benefits they would have received by becoming principals in the 
Utah corporation of McNeil/Mehew. The torts allegedly committed by 
tne nonresident counterclaim defendants against Benz and Cowan are 
significant. Benz and Cowan have been deprived of participation in 
a lucrative business opportunity and/or deprived of substantial 
compensation for valuable services rendered. The actions of the 
nonresident defendants have had a definite, foreseeable impact in 
Utah. 
2utah Code Annotated § 78-27-24. A more extensive 
discussion of the bases for personal jurisdiction is contained in 
Defendants' and Counterclaimants' Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Leave to Amend Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional 
Parties (Tr. at 578-89). 
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Transacted Business Within This State. 
Remlinger as an agent for Buttonwood and its 
partners, negotiated extensively with McGregor and Richardson -
both by telephone over interstate lines and in person, including 
at least one personal visit to Utah for the specific purpose, in 
part, of determining how to deal with the claims of Cowan and 
Benz. Deposition of D. Scott McGregor (Jan. 18 and 19, 1983) at 
239-45, 274, 279, 306; (Feb. 24, 1983) at 4-5, 8-11. 
Buttonwood was involved directly in interstate commerce 
by funding McNeil/Mehew which is actively engaged in soliciting 
interstate business. Buttonwood and its individual partners, 
acting through their agents, Remlinger and Caruso, have sought the 
protection of the State of Utah by entering into agreements for 
the subsequent incorporation of a Utah corporation and its 
business operation in Utah. See Exhibit 46 to Deposition of 
D. Scott McGregor. Remlinger and Caruso are directors of 
McNeil/Mehew. Id. 
3. The Personal Jurisd~ction of t>i~tah Courts Over 
Nonresident Defendants is as Broad as the Fourteenth 
--~---
The Utah Supreme Court now recognizes that the Utah 
State Legislature intended to make its jurisdictional reach over 
nonresident defendants as broad as the Fourteenth Amendment would 
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allow. Such has not always been the case. A restrictive view 
characterized by Cate Rental Co. v. Whalen & Co., 549 P.2d 707 
(Utah 1976); Hill v. Zale Corporation, 482 P.2d 332 (Utah 1971), 
prevailed earlier. Under the former standard, jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants was exerted provided the non-resident 
defendant was engaged in some substantial activity with some 
degree of continuity within the state. Mallory Engineering, supra 
at 1006 n.2. 
The more recent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court 
uphold the expansive grant of jurisdictional power intended by the 
legislature. See, ~, Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper 
Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978). The current standard 
was summarized by the Utah Supreme Court in Mallory Engineering, 
supra: 
The resultant standard for determining a 
nonresident's amenability to the jurisdiction of 
the state courts is not whether the nonresident 
is "present" in the state, but rather whether the 
nonresident has such contacts with the "state of 
the forum as make it reasonable, in the context 
of our federal system of government, to require 
the (nonresident) to defend the particular suit 
which is brought." This reasonableness standard, 
incorporating the requirements of fair play and 
substantial justice, looks to the quality and 
nature of the nonresident's contacts with the 
forum state. Therefore, the central concern of 
the inquiry into personal jurisdiction is the 
relationship of the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation, to each other. 
Mallory Engineering, supra at 1007 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
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The nonresident counterclaim defendants' transaction of 
business through their agent{s) satisfies the required minimal 
factual nexus. The nonresident counterclaim defendants have 
purposely availed themselves of the privilege of contracting under 
the laws of the State of Utah for the incorporation of a Utah 
corporation in which they would possess a substantial ownership 
interest. By doing so, they have invoked the benefits and 
protection of this state. Personal jurisdiction over these 
nonresident counterclaim defendants is warranted on the basis of 
the business they have transacted through their agents in this 
state. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the two defendants in this action, Peter A. Benz, 
a nonresident, has been held to be subject to the personal 
jurisdiction of the Utah courts. There is no dispute that the 
counterclaims of the defendants are compulsory in nature. If 
defendants' compulsory counterclaims are not permitted to be tried 
in the District Court, Rule 13, together with the doctrines of 
collateral estoppel and res judicata will preclude defendants from 
raising their claims in the action that is currently stayed in a 
New Jersey state court. In short, the question presented by 
this appeal is whether a nonresident defendant may be held 
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,,,, tage to the personal Jurisdiction of this state's courts, 
~nrl simultaneously denied the opportunity to have adjudicated 
mer1tor1ous compulsory counterclaims. 
Sound legal precedent and equitable considerations 
support defendants' position. The District Court abused its 
d1scret1on in failing to grant defendants' Motion for leave to 
file their amended answer and counterclaims and to join additional 
parties. Neither the District Court nor the plaintiffs 
articulated specifically how plaintiffs would be prejudiced if the 
trial were postponed. Plaintiffs have not detailed any financial, 
commercial or legal interests that would have been impaired had 
the trial date been continued. Defendants' Motion to Amend was 
the first request to amend pleadings in this action. There had 
been no continuances requested in this case. 
The District Court in its Memorandum Decision stated two 
reasons for denying appellants' Motion for Leave to File an 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional Parties. 
The Court stated that "defendants' Motion to Amend and to Join 
Aaa1t1onal Parties would raise new issues, delay the long-standing 
trial date, and would seriously prejudice the plaintiffs having 
the matter heard as scheduled." (Tr. at 366). 
Appellants concede that the granting of the Motion for 
J,Pave to File an Amended Answer both would have raised new issues 
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and delayed the trial date. However, neither of those grounds 
indicates that plaintiffs would have been seriously preJudiced 1 , 
their rights. It was entirely appropriate and expected that the 
issues raised in the New Jersey action would be adjudicated in the 
Utah action because this was what the plaintiffs represented to 
the New Jersey Court and was the reason why it was stayed. The 
inclusion of these issues was not the inclusion of spurious or 
indirectly related issues. The issues presented by appellants' 
counterclaim were directly related to the occurrences and 
transactions that formed the basis for plaintiffs' complaint. 
The determination whether to delay a trial date must 
involve a careful and fair weighing of the interests of justice. 
Although the District Court stated that the interests of justice 
led it to conclude that the Motion should be denied, it is 
incomprehensible to suggest that one party should be forever 
foreclosed from ever having its day in court in order to avoid 
temporarily delaying another party's day in court. 
Plaintiffs argue that defendants filed an Answer in this 
action and therefore had an opportunity at that time to present 
any counterclaims. It should be emphasized that the Answer was 
filed only after Defendant Benz unsuccessfully challenged the 
jurisdiction of the Utah courts. The facts in this case are clear 
in demonstrating that Appellant Benz at each juncture attempted tn 
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,,~serve his right to contest the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
er him by the Utah courts. He was compelled to answer in this 
a_t1on at the peril of being subject to a default judgment. His 
filing of the action in New Jersey was a timely and responsible 
effort to present valid claims against plaintiffs and other 
parties that properly should be included in this action. 
The Joint Memorandum filed by plaintiffs, together with 
uonald Remlinger and McNeil/Mehew, in support of their motion to 
dismiss or stay the New Jersey action, represented to the court 
that if a stay were ordered in the New Jersey action, the Utah 
courts would be able to "effectively dispose of all the issues in 
this action." (Tr. at 565). They also argued that "the Utah 
action will certainly afford 'adequate relief' and 'do complete 
Justice' between these parties. (Tr. at 567). 
The New Jersey court stayed that action on the condition 
that Donald Remlinger submit to the jurisdiction of the Utah 
courts and that all issues be considered there. The Stay Order of 
the New Jersey court was entered on November 4, 1982. Five weeks 
later Appellants Benz and Cowan filed their Motion for Leave to 
File Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional 
Parties in the Utah action, which asserted, as has been conceded 
by plaintiffs, essentially the same claims that had been presented 
in the New Jersey action. Contrary to the letter and spirit of 
Lhe representations mad~ by plaintiffs and others to the New 
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Jersey court to inauce it tu '-1' ar,t a std/ o! procePrl ina s in Lr .. 
action, plaintiffs have tenaciously resisted every effort of 
appellants to have their claims incluaen in this action. 
For these reasons, defendants submit that the District 
Court's decision to deny defendants' Motion for Leave to File an 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional Parties ~a' 
an abuse of discretion and requires reversal. 
DATED this /5~ day of July, 1983. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Merlin O. Baker 
Adams 
Attorneys for Appellants 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1996 
Telephone: (801) 523-1500 
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